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The conundrum of communication in bargaining has been resolved only in part. While 
theorists and empiricists have come to agree that communication can enhance bargaining 
efficiency through honest revelation and coordination, the spirit of Farrell’s conclusion from 
over two decades ago still holds: ―The role of talk in games is still little understood (1988: 
213). Given the opportunity, bargainers tend to over-communicate—to share more 
information, more honestly, than predicted in equilibrium. Speakers are more revealing than 
dictated by their economic interests and receivers place more weight on unverifiable 
information than theory suggests is rational (Blume & Ortmann, 2007; Cai & Wang, 2006). 
As a result, communication prior to or during bargaining tends to increase, though it cannot 
guarantee, outcome efficiency in games with private information (Crawford, 1990; Farrell & 
Gibbons, 1989; Rabin, 1990).  When all information is public, communication enhances 
coordination if such a strategy is possible (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1992; 
Demichelis & Weibull, 2008; Ellingsen & Östling, 2010; Farrell, 1987). Perhaps most 
notably, communication leads to ―fair‖ outcomes at a rate higher than predicted in equilibrium 
across multiple types of bargaining, including dilemma games, fairness and trust games, and 
games with private information (Brosig, Weimann, & Yang, 2004; Crawford, 1998; Frey & 
Bohnet, 1996; Sally, 1995; Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, & Bazerman, 2002). But not all 
communication in bargaining is mutually beneficial. Experimental evidence suggests that 
communication results in positive payoffs for dishonesty (Croson, Boles, & Murnighan, 2003; 
Demichelis & Weibull, 2008) and that the expectation of dishonesty, especially in non-face-
to-face forms of communication, increases impasse rates (Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998). 
Furthermore, free-form communication in some instances reduces cooperation relative to no 
communication (Blume & Ortmann, 2007; Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Croson, 1999) and may 
heighten competitiveness in bidding (Bolton, Chatterjee, & McGinn, 2003).  
Because communication conveys information about what is appropriate in the 
interaction (March & Olsen, 2006; Messick, 1999) as well as objective information 
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(Crawford, 1998; Farrell, 1993; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; Sally, 2005), further understanding of 
why and how talk sometimes makes bargaining more cooperative and other times makes 
bargaining more competitive may rest on studying what is being communicated about the 
underlying purpose of the interaction. Notions about the nature of the interaction form the 
basis for bargaining behavior and the final terms of agreement (or disagreement). This view of 
communication is consistent with Charness and Dufwenberg’s musings as to why people 
communicate so much during bargaining: ―Perhaps they are bargaining on what they should 
all agree is the right thing to do‖ (2006: 1595) 
In this chapter, we argue that the content of communication frames the bargaining 
situation and thus can help predict bargaining behavior and final agreements. We go beyond 
the truthfulness of content (Croson et al., 2003) or a player’s signaling of type that other 
players may use in determining their own moves (Crawford, 2003) to argue that 
communication primes behavior by signaling the fundamental nature of the interaction, i.e., 
―the right thing to do.‖ An example from takeover negotiations helps illustrate our ideas. 
Scholars studying mergers and acquisitions predict the likelihood of agreement and terms of 
final deals using factors like competing offers (number, size, financing details like all shares 
or all cash) and firms’ financial numbers. But if you ask investment bankers of the acquiring 
company what factors are most important in explaining the details of a deal, they will start 
talking about one of the first meetings with the investment bankers of the target firm, when no 
clients are present. In this meeting, the bankers attempt to agree on a common language 
defining the interaction. An acquisition mutually conceived of and explained as a ―merger of 
equals,‖ for example, results in a different subsequent negotiation process and outcome than a 
deal labeled an ―unfriendly takeover.‖ In other words, the bargaining frame is determined 
through early and endogenous communication, that is communication evolving in the 
interaction among players during bargaining. This frame shapes negotiators’ behaviors and the 
terms of the final agreement.   
We focus on how communication frames understandings about the fundamental nature 
of and purpose for the bargaining, taking the role of communication as a vehicle for 
potentially honest revelation and an opportunity for coordination as given. Communication 
shapes the shared understanding of the negotiation and this, in turn, shapes the admissible 
arguments and strategies. In the section that follows this introduction, we review the existing 
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literature on communication and fairness in bargaining to establish the current scientific 
knowledge on how talk enhances cooperation in some instances and increases competitiveness 
in others.
3
 We discuss framing in the third section, applying logics from fields outside 
economics to the study of bargaining. In the next section, we draw from experimental studies 
that permit some form of communication in bargaining to establish how talk before or within 
bargaining induces bargaining frames that drive beliefs, behaviors and outcomes. We close 
with a discussion of how experimental studies can distinguish bargaining frames from other 
effects of communication in bargaining.  
Fairness and Communication in Bargaining 
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the complex and opaque effects of communication 
in bargaining, economists studying bargaining behavior and outcomes often disregard 
communication completely, restrict interaction to offers and counteroffers, or study the mere 
presence of communication while ignoring or constraining its content. Standard equilibrium 
predictions about bargaining assume competitive behavior will drive outcomes, resulting in 
payoffs reflecting parties' resources outside of negotiations (Nash, 1951; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1953). Research on fairness and communication suggests an alternative point of 
view. This research suggests that bargaining outcomes are likely to reflect fairness concerns, 
just as other interpersonal behavior reflects fairness concerns (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1986). Experimental studies of bilateral bargaining and public goods games find that 
agreements negotiated with full or partial communication often conform to fairness norms as 
much as or more than they conform to competitive, game-theoretic predictions (Frey & Meier, 
2004; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996b). 
The possible role for communication in triggering fair outcomes varies with the 
presence or absence of private information. Communication allows private information to be 
shared, increasing the chance for coordination on a mutually agreeable outcome (Rabin, 1990; 
Valley et al., 2002). In spite of theoretical arguments that each party in a negotiation would 
prefer to coordinate on a point that will provide him or her with the largest possible portion of 
the available resources (Farrell & Gibbons, 1989), empirical evidence suggests that when two 
parties communicate, they tend to truthfully reveal sufficient information to allow not only 
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coordination, but coordination on a point that results in a relatively equal split of available 
resources (Bolton et al., 2003; Bolton & Brosig, 2007; Valley et al., 1998). In most economic 
theory, games in which all relevant information is known by both parties prior to play 
eliminate the formal informational advantages of communication. Empirical evidence 
suggests that communication continues to play a powerful role nonetheless. In a meta-analysis 
of dilemma games, Sally (1995) found that pre-play communication allowed the solicitation 
and conveyance of promises to act non-selfishly. These promises were relied on and kept in 
the decision phase. Pre-play discussions increased the likelihood of cooperative behavior even 
after controlling for promises, resulting in 40 percent more cooperation than play not preceded 
by talk (Sally, 1995). As in games with private information, communicating prior to or in the 
process of bargaining with full information appears to stimulate coordination beyond that 
owing to the exchange of objective information.  
Concerns for fairness rest on some interdependence in preferences or in actions taken 
by at least a subset of players (Rabin, 1993). Interdependence in preferences is usually 
modeled by assuming that people care about relative payoffs as well as absolute payoffs 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Interdependence in actions is modeled 
through reciprocity, whereby people are generous to others who are generous and stingy or 
even spiteful to those who are stingy (Rabin, 1993). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) show how individual preferences for equity, reciprocity and cooperation can 
lead to fairness equilibria.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that markets are comprised of 
players with different preferences, some ―fair types‖ and some ―selfish types,‖ and use this 
observation to explain the divergence in bargaining outcomes. They show that a small fraction 
of players who care about fairness can move outcomes toward equal payoffs and away from 
competitive equilibrium. All three of the models discussed here assume fixed types within a 
heterogeneous population and so exclude the potential for one party to influence another’s 
underlying preferences. Nevertheless, it is not a big leap to suggest a potential for parties to 
influence preferences by framing in terms of competition or fairness. 
While interdependence models do not suggest types are unstable, neither do they 
provide evidence that types are stable. Accumulating evidence suggests that preferences for 
fairness are labile and may be affected by numerous features of the bargaining context. In 
survey data and in an n-person public good game, for example, Frey & Meier (2004) found 
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that a player’s pro-social behavior is dependent on others’ behavior—people increased their 
willingness to contribute in response to others’ willingness to contribute.  Bardsley and 
Sausgruber (2005) ran a series of public goods games designed to isolate conformity effects 
from reciprocity effects and concluded that conformity, using others’ behavior as a guide to 
one’s own behavior independent of the material consequences, explains over 30 percent of 
contributions. The generalized notion emerging from theory and empirical studies is that 
people moderate their bargaining behavior to be consistent with the motives and behavior they 
ascribe to other parties, even when that behavior is independent of or counter to one’s own 
economic self-interest.  
Communication between parties acts as a vehicle for conveying and thereby affecting 
others’ motives underlying behavior. Past research suggests two possible mechanisms through 
which communication conveys and shapes negotiators’ motives.  First, the mere presence of 
conversation may establish social closeness, heightening preferences for fair treatment and 
increasing utility for other players’ positive outcomes (Kachelmeier & Towry, 2002; McGinn 
& Croson, 2004; Sally, 1995). Personal communication irrelevant to economic payoffs can 
increase other-regarding preferences (Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006). In this mechanism, 
it is the presence of communication, rather than the content, that moves payoffs toward what 
is seen as fair in a given situation. Alternatively, communication may allow for the emergence 
of a dominant, shared frame for an interaction (de Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & van de Vliert, 
1994). Talking before extending offers allows parties to mutually define the objective function 
for an interaction. This mechanism suggests that ―mere‖ talk will not reliably increase the 
likelihood of fair outcomes. Rather, the content of the communication should influence 
outcomes by affecting shared notions of appropriate behavior (Messick, 1999). Talk 
specifically eliciting fairness concerns should move outcomes toward an equal distribution of 
available resources. Conversely, competitive payoffs should become compelling when talk 
highlights bargaining power or resource asymmetries.  
Frames in Bargaining Games 
The social world is . . . a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be 
readily evoked by altering the ways in which observations are framed and categorized. 
(Edelman, 1993: 232) 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1984; 1974) introduced framing into the decision literature in 
terms of gains and losses. In their terms, a decision frame is the decision maker’s ―conception 
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice‖ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981: 453). Frames were viewed as partly controlled by the presentation of 
choices and partly by ―norms, habits and personal characteristics‖ (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981: 453). Bazerman and Neale (1985; Neale & Bazerman, 1992) transferred the concept of 
gain-loss frame to the study of two-party bargaining, where frames are manipulated through 
reference to an alternative or anchor. Targets or goals can act as anchors in the absence or 
stead of actual alternatives (Blount, Valley, Neale, & Bazerman, 1994). Negotiating parties 
are more willing to grant concessions when an outcome is framed as a gain than when the 
economically identical outcome is framed as a loss.  Gain frames are associated with a higher 
likelihood of settlement and greater mutual gain (i.e., higher total payoffs across parties) 
(Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985), while loss frames are associated with conflict 
escalation (Bazerman, 1984) and impasse (Bazerman & Neale, 1985). 
In the negotiation research following Tversky and Kahneman’s introduction of 
decision frames, gain or loss frames are typically treated as individual cognitions triggered 
through game instructions or bargaining alternatives, but a few studies offer some insight into 
the possible role of communication. In an experimental study of a two-party bargaining game 
with three issues and private information, parties offered larger concessions and more 
conciliatory counteroffers when the other party’s communication stimulated a gain frame 
(e.g., ―I really have to make a profit.‖) than when it stimulated a loss frame (e.g., ―I really 
have to cut expenses.‖) (de Dreu et al., 1994). Responses outside of formal concessions and 
counteroffers also reflected the other party’s frame. Communication following gain-framed 
messages was more likely to be phrased in terms of gains than that following loss-framed 
messages (de Dreu et al., 1994).  Though gain-loss frames are cognitive representations of the 
bargaining situation, they appear to be malleable through communication.    
A broader conceptualization of bargaining frames borrows from the communications 
literature. Research in this realm views frames as the lens through which bargainers 
understand the situation, interpret others’ behavior, and make choices regarding their own 
behavior (Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994; Putnam & Holmer, 1992; Schweitzer & 
deChurch, 2001). In this conceptualization, to frame a negotiation is ―to select some aspects of 
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a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation‖ (Entman, 1993: 52). This view of framing is consistent with the 
strong effects attributed to exogenous frames on behavior in bargaining games (Blount & 
Larrick, 2000; Dufwenberg, Gächter, & Hennig-Schmidt, 2006; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 
1996a). Dufwenberg and colleagues (Dufwenberg et al., 2006) show the power of ―give‖ or 
―take‖ labels in a public contributions game and conclude that a label drives contributions 
through first- and second-order beliefs about expected and appropriate behavior. Similarly, 
Robert and Carnevale (1997) found that the frame attached to a bargaining game—―fairness‖ 
or ―rational‖ as manipulated through written instructions—affects the generosity of ultimatum 
offers. In perhaps the best known example of labels framing a bargaining game (Liberman, 
Samuels, & Ross, 2004), ―The Community Game‖ frames a prisoner’s dilemma game as a 
cooperative endeavor, in which interaction can lead to mutual gain and competition would be 
morally reprehensible; in contrast, ―The Wall Street Game‖ frames the interaction as a 
competitive enterprise, in which interaction leads to only the best coming out on top and 
letting the other win would be weak and foolish. The label given to the interaction forms the 
―communicating text‖ that promotes a particular view of the bargaining game.   
Blount and Larrick (2000) present bargaining frame as a choice made in the process of 
negotiating. As such, frames are open to social influence within the bargaining interaction. 
Across four studies using alternative frames of ultimatum bargaining games, they show that 
both senders’ and recipients’ behaviors reflect their selected frame, but—critically—frames 
are chosen not only to maximize individual payoffs, but also to reflect perceptions of fairness 
and respect. Also studying ultimatum games, Schotter and Sopher (2007) find that 
intergenerational advice, suggestions transmitted from an experienced, ―retired‖ player to a 
new, active player, affects the new player’s contributions. Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio 
(1992) present similar findings in the context of a coordination game in which subjects were 
given a public, nonbinding suggestion about which equilibrium to play. Suggestions to select 
the symmetric and efficient equilibrium were followed by both players, while suggestions of 
inefficient or ―unfair'' equilibria were rejected as inconsistent with the presentation of the 
game, in spite of being more beneficial to one of the players.  
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In none of the studies mentioned above do frame selections result from communication 
among bargaining parties, but if the label or a set of instructions associated with a bargaining 
game can prime behavior in economically meaningful ways, certainly the content of 
communication prior to or during bargaining can have meaningful framing effects on 
bargaining behaviors and outcomes. Studies have shown that social norms proposed in pre-
game communication elicit behavior that appears to conform to those norms (Bicchieri, 2002), 
even when there is no possibility of detection or punishment of non-normative behavior 
(Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2011). Bohnet and Frey (1999) 
provide a glimpse into the role communication plays in the creation of bargaining frames in 
dilemma and dictator games. The authors found a broad range of what they call ―meaning 
exchange‖ when open-form communication was allowed, even in dictator games in which 
there is no mechanism for the recipient of an offer to enforce social norms. As a result, 
communication sometimes led to increases and sometimes led to decreases in dictators’ 
allocations (Bohnet & Frey, 1999). Though the authors do not report coding the content of the 
communication, we propose that a simple dichotomous split of the content of pre-game 
communication as invoking a cooperative or competitive frame would reliably predict the 
direction of allocations. 
 Allowing bargaining frame shaped by communication to set parameters for 
subsequent bargaining behavior is consistent with Farrell and Rabin’s proposition that people 
respond in predictable ways to ―ordinary, informal talk‖ (1996: 104), but that free-form 
communication will not ensure equilibrium outcomes, or even fair play. Closer examination of 
the content of talk, however, both in experimental research and in bargaining theory, may 
reveal simple rules of frame disclosure and reliance that enhance our ability to predict 
bargaining behavior and outcomes.   
Communication as Behavioral Framing Mechanism 
Studying the role of communication in bargaining requires some way to measure or 
assess the content of talk. Experimental studies of bargaining games have borrowed from 
content coding methods used in social psychology when coding free-form communication, 
whether pre-play messages or exchanges embedded in play. Past empirical research in the 
social psychology bargaining literature captures and codes communication to measure effects 
of certain types of communication on payoffs. Examples include the nature of first offers, 
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competitive versus interest-based statements, and strategy sequences (Olekalns, Smith, & 
Walsh, 1996; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 
1990). Typically, authors develop a coding scheme based on a subset of the communication 
data and then train research assistants who are blind to the hypotheses to code the full data set. 
Houser & Xiao (2011) introduce an incentivized variant on the standard coding procedure 
borrowed from social psychology. They suggest treating coding as a coordination game in 
which coders are rewarded if their independent classifications of a statement match those of 
other coders. 
The simplest level at which to examine the potential for communication to frame 
bargaining processes and outcomes is a single message. In practice, much of the research on 
communication in bargaining allows only single pre-play messages. But, all messages may not 
be created equal. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) offer evidence for the power of content 
coding and predicting subsequent bargaining behavior from single, pre-play messages. They 
study a trust game with a chance move that obscures player B’s choice. Player B can send a 
single unstructured message to player A before player A decides on the first move. Each pre-
play exchange was coded as a ―promise,‖ ―empty talk,‖ or no message. Charness and 
Dufwenberg then compare this content with player B’s beliefs and subsequent decisions. 
Promises appear to affect player B’s beliefs about what player A believes—those who make 
promises believe the other player expects them to fulfill their promises. Players move in 
accordance with their beliefs about the other’s beliefs, resulting in significantly more trusting 
and trustworthy behavior with communication than without it. Charness and Dufwenberg 
explain the behavior as ―guilt aversion,‖ a willingness to forgo monetary payoffs to avoid 
breaking a perceived promise. Framing offers a less moralistic explanation: people behave 
heuristically in ways consistent with the situational norms established through 
communication. 
The demonstrated power of labels and pre-play messages on bargaining behavior and 
outcomes suggests early communication may be more influential than later messages. Testing 
this proposition explicitly, Cason and Mui (2007) found that coordination was greatest when a 
binary message was allowed prior to any play, relative to when no message was allowed or 
the message followed an initial move. Whether talk is allowed before formal offers are 
submitted, accompanying formal offers, or to explain them afterwards may have meaningful 
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effects on the opportunity to frame the interaction and shape the final agreement. Brandts and 
Cooper’s (2007) principle-agent game ran for 20 rounds (after 10 rounds of practice play), but 
the one-way communication permitted in their game had reached its maximum benefit in the 
first five rounds and effort remained at this high level for the next fifteen rounds. McGinn and 
Keros (2002), studying a bilateral auction with private information and free-form 
communication, found that that outcome types (e.g., impasse, equal split) could be reliably 
predicted from early exchanges between bargaining parties. Once a bargaining frame has been 
established through early communication, it appears to be persistent and difficult (but not 
impossible) to change.  
In addition to the timing of communication, the symmetry of communication may 
affect framing. One-way communication may be sufficient to frame an interaction, but the 
understanding of the game could be reinforced or undermined as additional messages by 
additional players bolster or contradict the initial frame. Brandts and Cooper (2007) offer a 
compelling illustration investigating the mechanism through which talk drives beliefs and 
behavior. They study a principle-agent, weak-link game with one supervisor and four 
employees with three treatments: incentives only, one-way communication (supervisor to 
employees), or two-way communication. In the communication treatments, written, public 
messages are allowed prior to play in each round. Only total effort across the group is 
observed. Relative to incentives only (which result in negative marginal profit), effort is three 
times higher with one-way communication and five times higher with two-way 
communication. Content coding allowed the authors to isolate and measure the effects of 
various types of messages. The most effective messages requested high effort, emphasized the 
benefit of such effort, and remarked positively on the level of pay (regardless of the actual 
level). Employees put in more effort, even in the absence of higher pay, when the supervisor 
framed the interaction as a cooperative and mutually beneficial endeavor and the employees 
were given the opportunity to communicate in response to their supervisor’s message.  
An experimental design with structured, pre-game communication emphasizing 
fairness or emphasizing competition could directly test the power of communication-induced 
frames in bargaining. McGinn, Milkman and Nöth (2011) offer an example of such a design. 
In a three-party bargaining game with complete information and unequal stand-alone payoffs, 
pre-play communication was limited to a public menu manipulated to include mostly 
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―fairness‖ talk or mostly ―competitive‖ talk. Each of the three parties was required to send the 
other two players messages from the treatment menu in a short period preceding play. 
Subsequent agreements in the fairness treatment were closer to equal division than those in the 
competitive treatment. Communication was critical—no differences in outcomes were found 
across separate treatments in which either a ―fair‖ or a ―competitive‖ menu was presented but 
no messages were required. In a second study, McGinn and her colleagues coded previously 
unexamined endogenous communication data from Croson et al.’s (2004) study of alternative 
equilibria in three-party takeover markets with externalities.  They developed a coding scheme 
that classified messages across 17 possible categories according to frame (i.e., about fairness, 
about competition, or about social interaction), deal specifics (e.g., discussion of possible 
offers), process issues (e.g., promises, requests) and emotion (e.g., positive emotion, negative 
emotion). Only frame reliably predicted agreement rates and payoff distributions in the final 
agreements. Messages communicating a competitive frame reduced the likelihood that all 
three parties would be included in the final deal, while a communication-induced fairness 
frame increased the likelihood of exactly equal splits. Consistent with the proposition that 
early talk effectively frames subsequent interaction in bargaining, restricting talk to initial 
exchanges continued to reliably predict equal splits. McGinn et al.’s findings suggest that 
detailed content coding of all communication may be unnecessary; coding for competitive or 
cooperative frame in pre-game talk or early exchanges within a game may be sufficient to 
predict subsequent bargaining behavior and outcomes.  
Distinguishing Framing from Other Effects of Communication  
Future experimental studies are needed to isolate framing from other communication 
effects.  As Wu and Larrick (this volume) argue, multiple factors affect beliefs. We have 
suggested here that communication induces bargaining frames that drive beliefs about how to 
behave and what to expect of others. This suggestion relies on prior findings from studies of 
communication in bargaining, specifically that communication is more truthful and relied on 
more frequently than expected in equilibrium, but not all talk is equal—some talk stimulates 
cooperation and other talk stimulates competition.   
Framing can be separated empirically from other mechanisms through which 
communication influences bargaining outcomes, including reputation effects, reciprocity, 
social identification across parties, and guilt aversion.  Further studies are needed, but past 
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research offers some evidence distinguishing framing from these other mechanisms.  Framing 
is differentiated from reputation effects in findings from Brandts and Cooper’s (2007) five-
person principal agent, weakest link game. They found that agents responded in keeping with 
the principal’s requests for high effort in spite of the fact that no individual agent’s effort level 
could be observed.  Reciprocity is taken out of play in numerous studies involving single play 
bargaining games following non-binding pre-play communication. Since no party has taken an 
action and play is simultaneous, differences across treatment can be attributed to the different 
frames induced by talk, but not to reciprocity across actions. Mohlin and Johannesson (2008) 
minimize the possibility that social identification with the other party could underlie 
communication effects in their ultimatum bargaining game by offering one-way messages 
from third parties not involved in the game.  Although the communication is not across 
involved parties, contributions after third party communication are 40 percent higher than 
those made in the no-communication treatment. Guilt aversion (Charness & Dufwenberg, 
2006) would be an unlikely explanation for McGinn et al’s (2011) finding that both 
exogenous and endogenous competitive talk can lead to more competitive outcomes than 
otherwise predicted or than observed with other frames or no communication. But each of 
these examples was chosen post hoc because it appears to rule out a reasonable alternative 
explanation, so any conclusions may be suspect. Future models and empirical studies can be 
explicitly designed to pit these alternative explanations against framing.  
The idea that non-binding communication can influence whether a bargaining game 
comes to be viewed as a cooperative or competitive interaction, and that appropriately 
cooperative or competitive behavior will follow, may seem to go outside the realm of 
economics.  But assuming the possibility that talk can shape bargaining frames is no further 
outside the realm of economics than the now well-established assumption that bargainers 
often honestly reveal private information and that their counterparts often rely on this 
information when making and deciding whether to accept offers. Because communication 
allows ―a kaleidoscope of potential realities‖ (Edelman, 1993), attention to bargaining frames 
may bring us closer to resolving the conundrum of  communication in bargaining.  
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